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Abstract 
While formal institutions are recognized as having an effect on trust formation, no 
theoretical or empirical models exist to formalize this relationship. This study 
introduces a new conceptual framework to explain trust building by individuals and the 
role that formal rules and laws may play in this process. Drawing on a social-cognitive 
theory of psychology, we present trust as composed of personal, interpersonal, and 
intrapersonal components with the latter encompassing formal institutions. We further 
demonstrate that there are three mechanisms – sanction, legitimacy, and autonomy – 
through which formal institutions may affect trust levels either directly or indirectly. In 
addition, our empirical analysis furnishes evidence of heterogeneity in institutional 
effects on trust, suggesting that the autonomy dimension of the institutional framework 
is particularly important for trust formation processes.  
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The impact of formal institutions on social trust formation: A social-
cognitive approach 
Introduction  
Current research offers two competing explanations regarding the mechanism through 
which trust emerges and changes. The first presents trust as a cultural attribute; hence 
manipulating its levels is regarded as unlikely to occur (Fukuyama, 2000; Putnam, 
1995, 2000). The second emphasizes that trust is a function of contexts (Kumlin and 
Rothstein, 2005; Nooteboom, 2007); its levels are expected to rise or fall depending on 
contextual variations. Studies often refer to institutional arrangements as one such 
contextual variable, asserting that trust can evolve according to the dynamics of 
institutional change (Farrell, 2005). Little consideration has however been given to the 
possibility of an interaction between cultural and contextual determinants of trust.  
The main objective of this research is to analyze the impact of formal institutions 
on social trust by drawing on a social-cognitive theory of psychology. Our contribution 
consists of utilizing psychology's analytical framework to introduce a new 
comprehensive model of trust formation. This model is further used to identify a set of 
formal institutions potentially important for trusting behavior and explicitly describe the 
mechanisms through which various institutional contexts interact with cultural forces of 
trust.  
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Literature overview  
The classical approach considers trust as a cultural attribute that is influenced by an 
individual's internal values, such as altruism or sympathy with others (Fukuyama, 2000; 
Putnam 1995, 2000). Recent studies dissociate trust building from an individual's 
personal attributes and externalize it by accounting for contexts within which trust 
formation processes unfold (Nooteboom, 2007; Rothstein and Stolle, 2001). This 
mainstream emphasizes that the quality of formal institutions, which regulate the 
interactions of individuals, may be the cornerstone of such contexts, and hence affect 
trust levels considerably (Farrell, 2005; Farrell and Knight, 2003).  
Trust theory uses a twofold definition of formal institutions. On the one hand, 
institutions are viewed as a set of public organizations that individuals interact with over 
the course of their lives. In this case, the process of trust formation is affected by such 
organizations when citizens evaluate the quality of their performance (Edlund, 2006; 
Mishler and Rose, 2001) or that of elected officials (Thomas, 1998). A positive 
experience with public institutions or public officials is expected to motivate individuals 
to exhibit more trust not only towards these institutions or their rules, but also towards 
other people (Letki, 2006; Murphy, 2004; Tyler, 2006). Additionally, this positive 
experience is believed to dampen the negative effect of some conventional determinants 
of trust: Fair treatment by public authorities may, for instance, cushion the negative 
impact of having a minority status (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2008). In eliciting trust, 
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public authorities' trustworthiness does not necessarily need to be objectively valid. 
Rather, what matters is the perception that citizens have regarding these organizations 
and not their actual quality (Levi, 1998; Scholz and Lubell, 1998; Steinmo, 1993). 
On the other hand, institutions are considered as a set of rules of the game 
defining legal boundaries within which individuals are allowed – and expected – to 
operate. Efficient formal institutions are deemed to be conducive to establishing trust 
since they enforce third-party agreements (Herreros and Criado, 2008). They enable 
individuals to pursue redress and restitution when cheated, thereby reducing the risk 
involved in trusting someone (Rothstein and Stolle, 2001; Tillmar and Lindkvist, 2007). 
If sanctions and penalties are imposed when a contract is breached, formal institutions 
may increase the cost of betrayal and encourage people to act honestly (Bohnet and 
Baytelman, 2007). Overall, formal rules are believed to help overcome the information 
deficit problem by indicating what the likely actions of others will be (Farrell and 
Knight, 2003) or to serve as a safety net for those who suffer because of others' 
dishonest behavior (Farrell, 2005). The mere existence of laws and rules is, however, 
insufficient to encourage the trust formation process. It is equally important that such 
legal mandates are duly enforced (Oskarsson et al., 2009) and perceived by individuals 
as being fairly applied to various population groups (Oskarsson et al., 2009). 
Despite the fact that both strands find empirical evidence for a positive 
relationship between the quality of formal institutions and trust levels, they exhibit two 
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deficiencies. The first is the problem of uni-dimensionality regarding the definition of 
formal institutions. Institutional economics distinguishes between several types of 
institutions (Lim and Decker, 2007; Persson and Tabellini, 1994), while theoretical and 
empirical studies on trust rarely provide a precise definition concerning the kinds of 
institutions they analyze, thereby implying that all formal rules and laws are equally 
important to interpersonal trust. This might not necessarily be true since particular 
formal institutions often only regulate certain aspects of societal arrangements and each 
of them may affect only specific features of an individual's behavior. The institutional 
impact on trust is hence likely to be heterogeneous across different formal institutions, 
and ignoring this may lead to the false conclusion regarding which institutions actually 
matter in eliciting interpersonal trust and to what extent each of them does so.  
The second shortcoming is that a clear formalization of the process of trust 
formation is lacking. Several competing theories describe how trust emerges but none 
offers a clear conceptual framework integrating cognitive, cultural, and contextual 
determinants into a single regression. Instead, most empirical studies either solely 
examine whether associations exist between trust levels and institutional scores while 
controlling for the socio-demographic characteristics of respondents (Herreros and 
Criado, 2008). Or, they offer mathematical models, derived from the rational choice 
perspective (Zak and Knack, 2001), which do not account for non-cognitive (cultural) 
forces beyond rational thinking that underlie an individual's decision-making regarding 
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whether or not to trust. This may impair establishing the complete set of channels 
through which formal institutions affect social trust levels.  
We argue that applying theories of psychology to explain trust building may 
help eliminate both drawbacks. Trust formation is governed by brain structures and 
hence represents a mental operation. Psychology in turn offers a solid analytical 
framework describing the rationale behind mental functions and behavior; it can thereby 
help understand how trust emerges and how various formal institutions may intervene in 
this process. In addition, psychology integrates cognitive and non-cognitive, conscious 
and subconscious mechanisms of an individual's decision-making and may hence allow 
the analysis to address cultural and contextual determinants of one's behavior 
simultaneously.  
 
Theoretical model  
Psychology asserts that people's behavior is determined by (1) values and norms, (2) 
others-regarding, and (3) duty-driven motivations/contexts within which individuals act 
(Feldman and Perez, 2009). Literature acknowledges that personal values shaped by 
culture and socialization processes are a starting point for behavioral action, but it 
denies that these values produce the same behavior in every situation (Seidler, 2011; 
Smith and Thornberry, 1995; White, 2002; Williamson, 2000).  
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By introducing the concept of moral identity, the social-cognitive perspective of 
psychology provides a comprehensive explanation for the existence of such behavioral 
deviations from values. The theory's point of departure is that every individual defines 
their own behavior based on their value identity (Bandura, 1991, 2001; Higgins, 1996; 
Narvaez et al., 2006; Shao et al., 2008) which is conceptualized as an organized mental 
representation (scheme) of how an individual with certain values is likely to think, feel, 
and act (Shao et al., 2008). People are believed to possess multiple and sometimes 
competing value identities corresponding to each particular situation. However, only 
one of them can be activated for processing social information at any given moment 
(Markus and Kunda, 1986). Which one is activated depends on the level of accessibility 
that different moral identities have (Markus and Kunda, 1986): The one which is more 
accessible exerts a stronger influence on behavior (Higgins, 1996). The theory further 
asserts that situational cues, defined as environmental factors that are connected to 
records (Byrnes, 2001), may influence the level of accessibility of moral identities 
(Bargh et al., 1986) by shifting mental representations from a state of low activation to a 
state of higher activation. Various contextual characteristics, including formal 
institutions, may represent such cues and hence play a central role in shaping 
individuals' behavior (Bargh et al., 1986; Shao et al., 2008).  
An overview of available studies on contextual cues allows us to distinguish 
between three key mechanisms through which contextual variables that are related to 
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formal institutions can affect the activation of certain value identities: (1) a sanction 
mechanism, (2) a legitimacy mechanism, and (3) an autonomy mechanism. The 
sanction mechanism assumes that the law has an expressive function: The public 
perceives stronger sanctions in legal instruments as a signal that dishonest behavior 
deserves greater moral condemnation (Feldman and Perez, 2009; White, 2002). Strong 
sanctions will likely cause people to feel that the prohibited act is morally problematic 
(Bandura, 1999; Paternoster and Simpson, 1996), as a result of which the mental 
representations relating to honest behavior may be activated, and good values will be 
enacted in behavior.  
Psychology further suggests that laws are an external factor designed and 
implemented by the government and hence the public. However, the understanding, 
interpretation, and enforcement of such laws in practice are personal (White, 2002). The 
legitimacy of formal rules or laws and the level of autonomy they promote may 
influence people's interpretation of these formal institutions (Kohlberg, 1981; White, 
2002). The legitimacy mechanism is derived from the idea that individuals tend to 
comply with the law and will act in a trustworthy way if they consider a particular law 
legitimate (Feldman and Perez, 2009), even if individuals have not yet internalized the 
relevant values promoted by the law (Stone, 2011). In the long run, individuals might 
even revise their own values and beliefs in the presence of legitimate formal institutions 
(Shao et al., 2008). The required legitimacy is usually achieved through enhanced 
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citizen participation in creating formal rules and norms (Feldman and Perez, 2009) or 
enabling information to be available about the formation of such rules.  
The autonomy mechanism presupposes that if formal rules and laws promote 
autonomy and independence, then individuals are encouraged to use good values in 
their behavior. Conversely, authoritarian rules or regimes with rigidly hierarchical 
organizations are believed to retard values enactment and development (Kohlberg, 
1981). The rationale behind this effect stems from personal ego theories which assume 
that more autonomy may strengthen the personal ego, and people with strong egos 
rarely develop poor values or deviate from good beliefs and morals in their behavior 
(White, 2002). 
Furthermore, psychology does not limit the role of situational cues to their 
impact on the accessibility of value identities, but also expands it to the aspect of others-
regarding. It is believed that one's personal experiences may prompt an individual to 
expect that others may hold similar views or act in a similar way as a result of a similar 
experience (Lewis and Weigert, 1985; Jones, 1996; Nooteboom, 2007). An individual 
affected by the situational cues may hence make references from their own experiences 
to others and expect that contextual effects on others' behavior will be similar to what 
they themselves experienced. This may reshape one's perception of others and result in 
considering other people as more honest and law-obedient in the presence of effective 
formal institutions. 
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We use the above overview of evidence and findings from psychology to 
introduce a simplistic model of trust building and formalize the relationship between 
institutional contexts and trust. We offer three propositions to achieve these objectives.  
First, psychology can contribute to reconsidering the composition of trust. By 
drawing on behavioral theories of psychology, we suggest that trusting as an actual 
behavior can be presented as consistent of three components: (1) a personal component 
(PC), (2) an interpersonal component (InterPC), and (3) an intrapersonal component 
(IntraPC) 
Trust = f(PC, InterPC, IntraPC).                                                                                 (1) 
The personal component encompasses an individual's values that are relevant to 
trust. These are shaped by an individual's origins and early socialization processes and 
can be broadly equalized to culture. Such values represent individuals' relatively stable 
personality trait (Colby and Damon, 1992; Smith and Thornberry, 1995) that directly 
affect trust building, irrespective of the context within which this individual operates. 
The personal component is expected to vary among individuals, even those who are 
subject to the influence of the same contextual factors.  
The interpersonal component encompasses the individual's perception of others 
or others-regarding. It is formed through interactions with other people and refers to the 
evaluation of others' trustworthiness in the course of deciding which level of trust to 
exhibit, if any. This is a conscious process of assessing observable and unobservable 
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characteristics about the other party to estimate the likelihood that promises made will 
be kept. The activation of this component is, on the one hand, based on cognitive 
mechanisms and depends on the individual's personal values and their ability to derive 
another individual's level of trustworthiness from the available information. On the 
other hand, the extent of trust that emerges depends on the actual characteristics of the 
one to whom trust is to be exhibited.  
The intrapersonal component relates to the environment or context within which 
the decision about trust levels is made. This context is expected to embrace a group of 
individuals or a country's entire population, regardless of their cultural origins, and 
subject them to the same set of formal rules that may potentially influence trust 
formation. The intrapersonal trust component is formed through the activation of 
rational mechanisms and conscious considerations to evaluate the quality of the context, 
to assess one's own experiences with this context, and to extrapolate these experiences' 
effects on one's own behavior to the behavior of others. Formal institutions may 
represent such an intrapersonal component since the same individual has varying levels 
of trust given different institutional frameworks, as experiments with immigrants 
demonstrate (Kumlin and Rothstein, 2008).  
Second, the three mechanisms through which the institutional context affects 
behavior can be used to derive three types of formal institutions that might influence the 
trust formation process. We associate the sanction mechanism with legal institutions, 
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such as the protection of property rights and contract enforcement legislation, since 
these institutions achieve their main objectives of reducing uncertainty over the long 
term and lowering transaction costs by detecting and sanctioning improper economic 
behavior (Troilo, 2011). Political institutions are linked to the legitimacy mechanism 
since they reflect the quality of the political system and democratic principles and hence 
measure the extent to which citizens can participate in creating rules (Acemoglu and 
Robinson, 2012). Regulatory institutions relate to the autonomy mechanism, since they 
set constraints on an individual's economic decision-making in the labor market, credit 
markets, etc. (Jalilian et al., 2007), and may therefore influence an individual's 
perception of how much autonomy is permitted regarding economic behavior.  
Third, psychology can contribute to further explaining the logic of institutional 
effects on trust formation. By changing the level of accessibility of value identities, the 
three mechanisms, on the one hand, affect the extent to which values possessed by the 
individual are enacted in practice and hence utilized in the trust building process. One's 
poor values that relate to distrust can be suppressed and still generate trust if well 
defined and efficiently enforced formal institutions are in place. On the other hand, the 
individual's personal experience with formal institutions may change their perception of 
others and the role that this perception plays in trust formation. One's perception of 
other individuals as untrustworthy can still result in displaying trust towards them if 
well defined and efficiently enforced formal institutions are introduced. The functional 
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form of this relationship assumes that the effects of both the personal and interpersonal 
components on trust are dependent on the value of the intrapersonal - contextual - 
component 
T = PC + InterPC + IntraPC + PC*IntraPC + InterPC*IntraPC                             (2)            
Additionally, if formal institutions may induce the revision of values and others-
regarding, as psychology predicts, then one can expect that the personal and 
interpersonal components become a function of the intrapersonal component: 
T = PC(IntraPC) + InterPC(IntraPC) + IntraPC                                              (3) 
We use the above observations to postulate our hypotheses:  
Hypothesis 1: An improvement in any of the three components of trust is associated 
with an increase in trust levels among individuals. 
Hypothesis 2: The overall effect of the personal and interpersonal components on trust 
is conditioned by the quality of the intrapersonal component. 
Hypothesis 3: An improvement in the intrapersonal component is expected to lead to 
positive changes in the personal and interpersonal components.  
 
Data and methods description  
Our empirical analysis is based on the European Social Survey (ESS) for the year 2004. 
We restrict the sample to people aged between 16 and 65 to primarily obtain economic 
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agents in active age for our analysis. A total of 25 countries are included in the sample, 
with observations numbering 32,582. 
The variables are operationalized as follows (see Appendix 1 for descriptive 
statistics).  
 
Dependent variable  
Social trust is measured through the conventional question: "Generally speaking, would 
you say that most people can be trusted or that you cannot be too careful in dealing with 
people?", with the response scale ranging from 0 "cannot be trusted at all" to 10 "can be 
fully trusted."  
 
Independent variables  
The personal component variable is constructed based on responses to 21 questions 
asking one's perception of how important various values or attitudes are to the 
respondent. Each item is measured on a six point scale ranging from 1 "very much like 
me" to 6 "not like me at all." The principle component factor analysis suggests that the 
items form three constructs. The first construct reflects one's general behavioral values 
regarding others, government and society. It is constructed by summing up responses to 
seven questions that ask whether it is important for the respondent to: (1) follow 
traditions and customs, (2) do what is told and follow rules, (3) get respect from others, 
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(4) behave properly, (5) be humble and modest, (6) live in secure and safe surroundings, 
and (7) that government is strong and ensures safety. The values of this construct range 
from 7 "very much like me" to 42 "not like me at all", with higher scores reflecting more 
socially desirable values. The second construct reflects one's preference for leisure and 
is constructed by combining questions that ask how important it is to the respondent to: 
(1) seek adventures and have an exciting life, (2) seek fun and things that give pleasure, 
(3) be successful and that people recognize achievements, (4) have a good time, (5) try 
new and different things in life, (6) show abilities and be admired, (7) be rich, have 
money and expensive things, (8) think new ideas and being creative, (9) make own 
decisions and be free. Its values vary from 9 "very much like me" to 56 "not like me at 
all", with higher scores reflecting more socially desirable values. The third construct 
reflects one's level of altruism and sympathy with others and is constructed by summing 
up responses to questions that ask how important it is to: (1) treat people equally and 
have equal opportunities, (2) understand different people, (3) help people and care for 
others' well-being, (4) be loyal to friends and devote to people close, (5) care for nature 
and environment. The values range from 5 "very much like me" to 30 "not like me at 
all," with higher scores reflecting less altruistic attitudes. 
The interpersonal component is measured by the question asking how worried 
the respondent is of being treated dishonestly. The response scale varies from 1 "very 
worried " to 4 "not at all." The rationale behind choosing this question is that the extent 
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to which an individual worries about dishonest treatment is a function of the individual's 
perception of others' trustworthiness. A relatively strong correlation (0.30) found 
between this question and the question that directly evaluates an individual's perception 
of others ("Would you say that people try to take advantage of you or that they are fair 
most of the time?") confirms validity of our assumption.  
The intrapersonal component is operationalized through three institutional 
scores. Political institutions are measured through the average of three World Bank 
Group institutional indexes reflecting the properties of a country's political system: 
voice and accountability, government effectiveness, and corruption control in 
government. Each item has values ranging from -2.5 "poor political institutions" to 2.5 
"very good political institutions." Economic institutions are operationalized through a 
contract enforcement and property rights protection index measured on a ten-point scale 
with higher values corresponding to better institutions. The data are sourced from the 
2007 annual report of Economic Freedom of the World (Gwartney et al., 2007). 
Regulatory institutions are measured by a regulation of labor, credit, and business index 
constructed by Economic Freedom of the World (Gwartney et al., 2007) with values 
varying from 1 "entirely regulated" to 10 "entirely independent from regulation". We 
average out all institutional indexes over three years (2003-2005) and re-scale them so 
that the final constructs have values between 0 "poor formal institutions" and 1 "good 
formal institutions."  
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Control variables  
The set of control variables includes the conventional determinants of trust: the 
frequency of meeting friends, number of years completed in full-time education, 
respondents’ gender, actual age, and household income. In addition, we include 
dummies specifying whether respondents have a paid job and whether they were born in 
the country they reside. We also control for respondents' level of political trust 
calculated as the sum of responses to questions asking how much trust an individual has 
in (1) country's parliament, (2) the legal system, (3) the police, (4) politicians, (5) 
political parties, with responses to each item ranging from 0 "no trust at all" to 10 
"complete trust." 
We test our hypotheses empirically at both individual and country levels. The 
individual-level analysis seeks to reveal individual and joint effects of the three trust 
components on the respondents' trust scores (Hypothesis 1). The main method of 
analysis is multilevel modeling which allows us to explain variations in trust levels with 
both upper and lower level factors. Formal institutions represent the upper level in all 
models. Accounting for such a hierarchical structure of our data is necessary to prevent 
the un-modeled country information from ending up being entirely pooled into the 
single individual error term (Kreft and Leeuw, 1998; Luke, 2004; Snijders and Bosker, 
1999). The basic empirical model takes the following form 
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T = γ00 + γ10PCij + γ20InterPCij + γ01IntraPCj + γ30Xij+ moj+ εij                                                (4)                                                                   
Here, PCij and InterPCij are measures of the personal and interpersonal 
components, respectively. IntraPCj consists of relevant measures of the three types of 
formal institutions that will sequentially be included in the model, X ij  is a set of control 
variables, moj is the variance at the country level, and εij is the variance at the individual 
level. We use STATA command GLLAMM for calculating the parameters of the 
model. We also include interactions between the intrapersonal component (formal 
institutions) and the two other components to see whether the institutional context 
conditions the impact that the personal and interpersonal components have on the 
respondents' trust levels (Hypothesis 2). 
The country-level analysis aims to determine if the intrapersonal component 
may trigger change in the two other components (Hypothesis 3). To do so, we employ a 
simultaneous equation model which can run several regressions simultaneously 
assuming that there is a certain cross-equation correlation. The set of equations includes 
a cross-country trust equation and two channel equations: one for the respondent's 
internal component and the other for the interpersonal component. Since laws and rules 
are believed to be a function of the local culture (Seidler, 2011; Williamson, 2000), we 
also consider institutions to be an endogenous variable and add an institutional equation 
to the simultaneous equation models. We use instrumental variables estimation to 
ensure that our structural parameters are identified. We also include other control 
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variables in the channel equations. The number of inclusions is sufficient to satisfy the 
order condition for identification. We estimate the full set of equations jointly by 
applying the STATA command reg3 to the aggregated data-set which is obtained by 
calculating the countries' mean values for all the variables 
T = α 1PCj + α2InterPCj + ε j                                                                                                                                   (5) 
PCj = β1Instrumentj + β2Latitudej + β3Protestantsj + β4IntraPCj  + ∂ j                                  (6) 
InterPCj = λ1Instrumentj + λ2Unemploymentj + λ3Educationj + λ4IntraPCj +ζj         (7) 
IntraPCj = γ1Instrumentj + γ2Political_stabilityj + γ3Controlsj  + θ j                                        (8) 
where PC and InterPC are measures of the personal and interpersonal 
components, respectively. IntraPC stands for the institutional variables. Instrument is 
the set of instruments for the selected constructs. We use latitude (Latitude) as an 
instrument for the internal - cultural - component of trust (La Porta et al., 1999). In 
addition, we include instruments for each of the three attitudes. The attitude towards 
others, government and society is approximated by an individual's level of religiosity. 
The preference for leisure is instrumented with the number of hours an individual works 
per week: A greater preference for leisure is expected to result in less hours of work. 
The attitude towards helping others is instrumented with the ESS question about the 
extent to which free help/care is available in the country. The free care variable is 
operationalized through an ESS question “Can you count on unpaid house/care help 
from anyone outside household” by counting the percentage of respondents in each 
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country who answered positively on this question. The rationale behind our choice is 
that more free care results from more altruistic values prevalent in the country. The 
interpersonal component is instrumented with the variable reflecting past experience 
with other people that is measured through the question: "In the last five years, how 
often did a plumber/builder/mechanic/repairer overcharge you?" The responses vary 
from 1"never" to 5 "more than five times." In addition, the equations contain the 
percentage of people adhering to protestant religion (Protestants), unemployment rate 
(Unemployment) and a country's average number of years of full-time education 
completed by respondents (Education).  
Regarding the contextual component, La Porta et al. (1999) argue that legal 
origins of a country's legislation can be used as an instrument for legal institutions. 
Fidrmuc (2003) suggests that one can instrument political institutions with the index of 
civil liberties. Mauro (1995) demonstrates that fractionalization indexes are good 
instruments for institutional scores. We utilize this approach for regulatory institutions. 
The World Bank index of political stability is included in each of the three institutional 
equations.  
 
Empirical analysis  
Our individual-level analysis (Table 1) suggests that people with good values are more 
likely to trust others. Similarly, trust increases when the respondents' perception of 
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others improves. Controlling for the context by including the institutional measures 
provides evidence that people who live in countries with better political, economic, and 
regulatory institutions usually exhibit greater trust scores. Overall, we receive support 
for Hypothesis 1.  
The regression coefficients for the economic and political institutional variables 
have relatively similar values, suggesting that legitimacy and sanction mechanisms are 
equally important for economic agents' decision-making regarding whether or not to 
trust. The regulatory mechanism has a stronger impact, implying that the autonomy 
dimension of institutional frameworks is indispensible for developing social trust. The 
results do not change substantially after controlling for the key trust determinants 
(Models 1 - 3 in Table 2) or instrumenting the institutional variables in order to 
eliminate the problem of endogeneity (Models 4 - 6 in Table 2).  
 
Tables 1 and 2 near here 
 
In addition, we find diverse interaction effects between the contextual 
component and the personal - cultural - component of trust (Tables 3). In the case of the 
preference for leisure, we receive support for crowding-out effects. By contrast, the 
positive effect of more socially desirable general behavioral values and altruism on trust 
is enhanced as the quality of a country's formal institutions improves. The interaction 
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effect is found to be particularly strong in the case of regulatory institutions. Regulatory 
institutions are also the only formal institutions that condition the impact of altruism and 
sympathy with others on trust. Countries with less economic regulation enhance the 
positive impact of altruistic attitudes on social trust levels. This may partially explain 
why people living in liberal economies where the welfare state provides limited support 
but formal institutions allow citizens a great degree of autonomy in their economic 
decision-making have relatively higher levels of trust compared to other societies. 
Similarly, there is a strong interaction between the three institutional indexes and the 
interpersonal component (Tables 3). The effect of the respondents' perception of others 
on their own level of trust can be widely regarded as a function of the quality of the 
institutional context: People tend to exhibit higher levels of trust at the given level of 
others' perceived trustworthiness when the quality of formal institutions improves. The 
interaction effect is found to be particularly strong in the case of regulatory institutions. 
Overall, our empirical evidence is commensurate with Hypothesis 2.    
 
Table 3 near here 
 
Simultaneous equation models (Table 4-6) suggest that formal institutions may 
also affect trust indirectly by changing both the personal and interpersonal components, 
which is in line with Hypothesis 3. An improvement in formal institutions of any kind is 
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associated with more preference for leisure but also with an improvement in general 
behavioral values and altruism. This suggests that not only the impact of the cultural 
variable on trust can to some extent be conditioned by formal institutions, but these 
formal institutions may trigger change in such values. Similarly, individuals' perception 
of others improves in the presence of better formal institutions, especially in the case of 
regulatory institutions.   
 
Tables 4, 5 and 6 near here 
 
Conclusion and discussion  
Overall, our study supports the new conceptual framework of the trust formation 
process that is derived from social-cognitive theories of behavior. Trust should be 
considered as composed of people's values, their perception of others, and the properties 
of the context in which they act. Formal institutions are an important part of this context 
and may influence trust in a threefold manner: by (1) imposing sanctions on those who 
deviate from rules, (2) ensuring the legitimacy of rules introduced, and (3) allowing 
citizens some degree of autonomy in their decision-making. The institutional effects on 
trust are found to be heterogeneous across formal institutions. Regulatory institutions 
that reflect the level of individual autonomy in economic decision-making show a 
stronger relationship with trust levels, values, and the individual's perception of others. 
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In addition to the direct effect, formal institutions may impact trust indirectly by 
changing the personal and interpersonal components. Trust is hence both a cultural 
attribute and a result of particular arrangements created by the institutional context.  
Further research is needed to analyze the percentage attributed to each 
component in the trust building process. It is likely that the composition of trust in terms 
of the three components can be a cultural variable in itself. In this case, culture would 
constrain trust formation not only through the value variables, but also through the role 
that these values are allowed to play in defining trust levels. Additionally, more analysis 
is needed to clarify the causal links between the three trust components. Formal 
institutions might not, for instance, constrain the effect of values on trust, but the effect 
of formal institutions on trust might be restricted by the existing values. 
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Table 1. The trust equation: A three-component approach 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
The personal component      
Preference for leisure  0.000 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
General behavioral values 0.049*** 0.046*** 0.047*** 0.045*** 0.046*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Altruism and sympathy with others -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.053*** -0.052*** -0.053*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
The interpersonal component      
Others-regarding   0.405*** 0.410*** 0.406*** 0.409*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) (0.015) 
The intrapersonal component       
Political institutions    4.202***   
   (0.103)   
Legal institutions     4.058***  
    (0.098)  
Regulatory institutions      6.146*** 
     (0.180) 
      
Variance at level 1 5.024  4.916  4.912    4.910  4.908 
 (0.039) (0.039) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Variance at level 2 0.171  0.465  0.262  0.289 0.174  
 (0.005) (0.015) (0.012) (0.013) (0.008) 
Number of countries  25 25 25 25 25 
Number of observations 32,582 32,582 32,582 32,582 32,582 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. 
†
p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).   
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Table 2. The impact of formal institutions on trust: A robustness check  
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
The personal component       
Preference for leisure  0.006*** 0.007*** 0.006*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.012*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) 
General behavioral values 0.041*** 0.042*** 0.042*** 0.047*** 0.049*** 0.042*** 
 (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003) 
Altruism and sympathy -0.042*** -0.042*** -0.043*** -0.030*** -0.030*** -0.030*** 
with others (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
The interpersonal component       
Others-regarding  0.291*** 0.294*** 0.291*** 0.287*** 0.305*** 0.286*** 
 (0.017) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017) 
The intrapersonal component        
Political institutions  2.326***   2.217***   
 (0.150)   (0.158)   
Legal institutions   2.212***   2.379***  
  (0.145)   (0.172)  
Regulatory institutions    4.543***   5.573*** 
   (0.230)   (0.281) 
Individual-level control variables       
Meeting friends 0.094*** 0.096*** 0.097*** 0.118*** 0.115*** 0.115*** 
 (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
Born in the country 0.111* 0.112* 0.119* 0.139** 0.135* 0.198** 
 (0.049) (0.049) (0.049) (0.050) (0.053) (0.050) 
Paid job 0.141*** 0.145*** 0.142*** 0.234*** 0.226*** 0.205*** 
 (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.030) (0.033) (0.030) 
Gender (Male =1) -0.007 -0.010 -0.011 0.029 0.013 0.019 
 (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) 
Age 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.007*** 0.011*** 0.011*** 0.009*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Years of education  0.062*** 0.063*** 0.061*** 0.087*** 0.091*** 0.083*** 
 (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Household income  0.052*** 0.049*** 0.052*** 0.020*** 0.022*** 0.028*** 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) 
Political trust 0.071*** 0.070*** 0.071*** 0.072*** 0.070*** 0.072*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) 
Variance at level 1 4.242 4.241 4.241    
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038)    
Variance at level 2 0.151 0.087 0.139    
 (0.011) (0.007) (0.011)    
Number of countries  25 25 25    
Number of observations 24,497 24,497 24,497 24,497 21,046 24,497 
R-squared    0.268 0.265 0.271 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. The estimation of models 4, 5 and 6 is conducted by applying STATA 
command reg3. The set of equations for the institutional variables took the following form:  
Political_institutions =0.990*** -  0.110***Civil_liberties  -  0.129***Soviet_dummy (Rsq= 0.896) 
Legal_institutions=0.592*** + 0.187***English_legal_origin + 0.043***French_legal_origin + 
0.089***German_legal_origin  -  0.087***Socialist_legal_origin + Scandinavian_legal_origin (ref. 
category)+ 0.003***Protestants + 0.001***Catholics -0.042***Orthodox - 0.099***Other_religions (Rsq= 
0.798) 
Regulatory_institutions = 0.431*** + 0.103***Language_fractionalization + 0.016***Political_stability + 
0.029***Corruption_perception_index (Rsq= 0.624) 
†
p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).    
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Table 3. Conditioning effects of formal institutions on the personal and interpersonal components of trust   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Note. Standard errors in parentheses. The list of control variables includes meeting friends, born in the country dummy, paid job dummy,  
gender dummy, age, years of education, household income and political trust.  
†
p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).    
Variables 
Political institutions Legal institutions Regulatory institutions 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
The personal component       
Preference for leisure  0.032*** 0.006** 0.027*** 0.007*** 0.042*** 0.007*** 
 (0.008) (0.002) (0.008) (0.002) (0.010) (0.002) 
General behavioral values 0.016 0.041*** 0.011 0.042*** 0.016 0.042*** 
 (0.0158) (0.003) (0.015) (0.003) (0.014) (0.003) 
Altruism and sympathy with others -0.037
†
 -0.042*** -0.036
†
 -0.042*** 0.001 -0.042*** 
 (0.019) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) (0.019) (0.004) 
The interpersonal component       
Others-regarding  0.293*** -0.065 0.289*** -0.143* 0.295*** -0.216
†
 
 (0.017) (0.103) (0.017) (0.064) (0.017) (0.120) 
The intrapersonal component        
Formal institutions 3.745*** 1.036* 2.460*** -0.438 7.164*** 2.185*** 
 (0.387) (0.414) (0.396) (0.271) (0.485) (0.556) 
Interactions       
Intrapersonal component *  -0.034***  -0.027*  -0.052***  
Preference for leisure (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.014)  
Intrapersonal component * General  0.032  0.038*  0.035
†
  
behavioral values (0.019)  (0.019)  (0.019)  
Intrapersonal component *  -0.005  -0.005  -0.061*  
Altruism and sympathy with others (0.025)  (0.025)  (0.028)  
Intrapersonal component *   0.485***  0.596***  0.760*** 
Interpersonal component  (0.138)  (0.086)  (0.174) 
Individual-level control variables yes yes yes yes yes yes 
Variance at level 1 4.238  4.239  4.243  4.239  4.239  4.241  
 (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) (0.038) 
Variance at level 2 0.125  0.145 0.235 0.183 0.097  0.205 
 (0.009) (0.012) (0.017) (0.014) (0.010) (0.016) 
Number of countries  25 25 25 25 25 25 
Number of observations 24,497 24,497 24,497 24,497 24,497 24,497 
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Table 4. Indirect effects of formal institutions on trust components: the case of general 
behavioral values 
Variables 
The intrapersonal component 
Political 
institutions 
Economic 
institutions 
Regulatory 
institutions 
The trust equation    
The personal component 0.158* 0.177* 0.174* 
 (0.068) (0.078) (0.083) 
The interpersonal component 2.732*** 2.549*** 2.623*** 
 (0.501) (0.583) (0.612) 
R-squared 0.634 0.664 0.652 
The personal component equation    
Religiosity  1.220*** 1.343*** 1.070*** 
 (0.357) (0.368) (0.341) 
Latitude   12.500** 10.320* 6.303 
 (4.041) (4.159) (4.588) 
Percentage of Protestants 0.001 0.003 0.012 
 (0.009) (0.010) (0.009) 
The external component 4.697* 4.468* 11.410*** 
 (1.896) (2.007) (4.171) 
R-squared 0.759 0.775 0.750 
The interpersonal component equation    
Unemployment rate -0.020* -0.014 -0.013 
 (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) 
Years of education  0.066* 0.063
†
 0.071* 
 (0.027) (0.033) (0.032) 
Past experience with others   -0.781** -0.641* -0.898*** 
 (0.296) (0.327) (0.284) 
The external component 0.749* 1.104* 1.758* 
 (0.344) (0.457) (0.848) 
R-squared 0.628 0.554 0.516 
The intrapersonal component equation     
Civil liberties  -0.076***   
 (0.016)   
Political stability  0.071* 0.148*** 0.030 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.023) 
Socialist dummy (Former socialist=1) -0.125***   
 (0.019)   
Legal origins dummy: English  0.019  
  (0.049)  
Legal origins dummy: French  -0.061  
  (0.038)  
Legal origins dummy: German  0.014  
  (0.043)  
Legal origins dummy: Socialist  -0.169***  
  (0.039)  
Language fractionalization   0.091* 
   (0.040) 
Corruption perception index   0.023*** 
   (0.006) 
R-squared 0.908 0.800 0.625 
Number of observations 25 25 25 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Scandinavian legal origins are used as a reference category. 
†
p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).    
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Table 5. Indirect effects of formal institutions on trust components: the case of preference for 
leisure 
Variables 
The intrapersonal component 
Political 
institutions 
Economic 
institutions 
Regulatory 
institutions 
The trust equation    
The personal component 0.165* 0.195** 0.147* 
 (0.065) (0.063) (0.063) 
The interpersonal component 3.575*** 3.343*** 3.686*** 
 (0.415) (0.428) (0.432) 
R-squared 0.586 0.640 0.551 
The personal component equation    
Hours worked per week -0.210* -0.306** -0.165 
 (0.0981) (0.110) (0.118) 
Latitude   18.820*** 18.160*** 20.290** 
 (4.754) (4.317) (6.700) 
Percentage of Protestants 0.006 0.011 -0.001 
 (0.0114) (0.0103) (0.0124) 
The external component -9.257*** -12.180*** -15.480* 
 (2.890) (3.417) (7.843) 
R-squared 0.594 0.622 0.405 
The interpersonal component equation    
Unemployment rate -0.015* -0.007 -0.011 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) 
Years of education  0.044
†
 0.029 0.052
†
 
 (0.025) (0.027) (0.029) 
Past experience with others   -0.498* -0.352 -0.654* 
 (0.252) (0.260) (0.257) 
The external component 1.074*** 1.494*** 2.002*** 
 (0.315) (0.381) (0.775) 
R-squared 0.625 0.531 0.490 
The intrapersonal component equation     
Civil liberties  -0.071***   
 (0.016)   
Political stability  0.076** 0.149*** 0.034 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.025) 
Soviet dummy  -0.130***   
 (0.019)   
Legal origins dummy: English  0.0280  
  (0.051)  
Legal origins dummy: French  -0.055  
  (0.039)  
Legal origins dummy: German  0.009  
  (0.044)  
Legal origins dummy: Socialist  -0.168***  
  (0.039)  
Language fractionalization   0.069 
   (0.043) 
Corruption perception index   0.023*** 
   (0.006) 
R-squared 0.909 0.800 0.617 
Number of observations 25 25 25 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Scandinavian legal origins are used as a reference category. 
†
p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).    
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Table 6. Indirect effects of formal institutions on trust components: the case of altruism and 
sympathy with others   
Variables 
The intrapersonal component 
Political 
institutions 
Economic 
institutions 
Regulatory 
institutions 
The trust equation    
The personal component -0.282* -0.398** -0.225 
 (0.141) (0.144) (0.145) 
The interpersonal component 3.692*** 3.477*** 3.770*** 
 (0.492) (0.510) (0.497) 
R-squared 0.491 0.525 0.464 
The personal component equation    
Free help 0.039* 0.032 0.036 
 (0.019) (0.020) (0.023) 
Latitude   1.584 1.514 2.068 
 (3.546) (3.688) (4.074) 
Percentage of Protestants 0.014* 0.013
†
 0.010 
 (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) 
The external component -4.976*** -5.196** -8.326* 
 (1.526) (1.746) (3.858) 
R-squared 0.356 0.202 0.209 
The interpersonal component equation    
Unemployment rate -0.020*** -0.015
†
 -0.018* 
 (0.006) (0.008) (0.008) 
Years of education  0.043
†
 0.040 0.051
†
 
 (0.023) (0.028) (0.028) 
Past experience with others   -0.519
†
 -0.490
†
 -0.673** 
 (0.237) (0.263) (0.245) 
The external component 1.048*** 1.375*** 1.911** 
 (0.311) (0.414) (0.736) 
R-squared 0.633 0.540 0.508 
The intrapersonal component equation     
Civil liberties  -0.074***   
 (0.016)   
Political stability  0.073** 0.150*** 0.036 
 (0.028) (0.027) (0.026) 
Soviet dummy  -0.127***   
 (0.019)   
Legal origins dummy: English  0.029  
  (0.049)  
Legal origins dummy: French  -0.053  
  (0.038)  
Legal origins dummy: German  0.020  
  (0.043)  
Legal origins dummy: Socialist  -0.162***  
  (0.039)  
Language fractionalization   0.077
†
 
   (0.044) 
Corruption perception index   0.022*** 
   (0.007) 
R-squared 0.908 0.801 0.622 
Number of observations 25 25 25 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. Scandinavian legal origins are used as a reference category. 
†
p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests).    
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  Appendix 1 
 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics for variables used for the analysis  
 
Variable Obs Mean SD Min Max 
Individual sample      
Social trust 37895 4.940 2.472 0.000 10.000 
Preference for leisure 34566 30.983 8.222 9.000 54.000 
General behavioral values 34304 19.431 5.613 7.000 42.000 
Altruism and sympathy with others 35050 13.053 4.262 5.000   30.000 
Others-regarding  37018 3.015 0.840 1.000 4.000 
Political institutions 38018 0.756 0.138 0.351 0.903 
Legal institutions 38018   0.747 0.142 0.440 0.930 
Regulatory institutions 38018 0.693 0.080 0.520 0.800 
Meeting friends 37895 4.909 1.555 1.000 7.000 
Born in the country 37951 0.913 0.281 0.000 1.000 
Paid job 38018 0.610 0.488 0.000 1.000 
Gender (Male =1) 37984 1.535 0.499 0.000 1.000 
Age 38018 40.287 13.867 16.000 65.000 
Years of education 37648 12.121 3.874 0.000 32.000 
Household income 29652 5.980 2.788 1.000 12.000 
Political trust 35772 22.646 10.222 0.000 50.000 
Aggregated sample      
Social trust 25 4.979 1.047 3.000   6.840 
Preference for leisure 25 31.085 1.997 26.977 35.292 
General behavioral values 25 19.534 2.169 14.095 23.053 
Altruism and sympathy with others 25 13.057 1.086 10.821 14.964 
Others-regarding 25 3.033 0.319 2.384 3.538 
Political institutions 25 0.758 0.141 0.351 0.903 
Legal institutions 25 0.746 0.143  0.440 0.930 
Regulatory institutions 25 0.695 0.082 0.520 0.800 
Religiosity 25   5.441 0.643 3.794 6.154 
Hours worked per week 25 40.718 3.342 34.102 50.207 
Free help 25 74.608   11.229 38.200 89.300 
Latitude 25   0.563 0.084 0.433 0.722 
Percentage of protestants 25 28.512   36.528 0.000 97.800 
Unemployment rate 25 8.255 4.105 3.500 18.300 
Years of education 25 12.158 1.609 6.590 13.998 
Past experience with others   25   1.597 0.133 1.317 1.848 
Civil liberties 25 1.774 0.945 1.000 4.630 
Political stability 25 0.874 0.537 -0.750   1.620 
Socialist dummy (Former socialist=1) 25 0.280 0.458 0.000 1.000 
Legal origins dummy: English 25 0.080 0.277 0.000 1.000 
Legal origins dummy: French 25 0.32 0.476 0.000 1.000 
Legal origins dummy: German 25 0.12 0.332 0.000 1.000 
Legal origins dummy: Socialist 25 0.280 0.458 0.000 1.000 
Political stability 25 0.874 0.537 -0.750 1.620 
Language fractionalization 25 0.256 0.207 0.010 0.640 
Corruption perception index 25   6.912 2.162 2.440 9.660 
      
 
 
 
 
